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A Mathematical Model for Behavioral Changes by Pair
Interactions and Its Relation to Game Theory
Abstract
A mathematical model for behavioral chan-
ges by pair interactions (i.e. due to direct
contact) of individuals is developed. Three
kinds of pair interactions can be distin-
guished: Imitative processes, avoidance pro-
cesses, and compromising processes. Repre-
sentative solutions of the model for two dif-
ferent interacting subpopulations are illus-
trated by computational results.
The equations of game theory are shown to
result for a special case of imitative pro-
cesses. Moreover, a stochastic version of
game theory is formulated. It allows the
derivation of equations for the most proba-
ble or the expected distribution of behavioral
strategies and of (co)variance equations. The
knowledge of the (co)variances is necessary
for the calculation of the reliability of game
theoretical descriptions.
The use and application of the introduced
equations is illustrated by concrete exam-
ples. Especially, computational results for
the selforganization of social conventions by
competition of two equivalent strategies are
presented.
1 Introduction
This paper treats a mathematical model for
the change of the fraction P (i, t) of individu-
als who show a certain behavior i. Models of
this kind are of great interest for a quantita-
tive understanding or prognosis of social de-
velopments. For the description of the com-
petition or cooperation of populations there
already exist game theoretical approaches
(see, for example, Mueller (1990), Axel-
rod (1984), von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944), Luce and Raiffa (1957)).
However, the model devoloped in this paper
shows to be more general, since it includes
as special cases
• not only the game dynamical equations
(Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988)), but
also
• the logistic equation (Verhulst (1845),
Pearl (1924), Helbing (1992)),
• the Gravity model (Ravenstein (1876),
Zipf (1946)),
• the Lotka-Volterra equations
(Lotka (1920, 1956), Volter-
ra (1931), Hofbauer (1981), Goel et.
al. (1971), Hallam (1986), Goodwin
(1967)), and
• the quantitative social models of Weid-
lich and Haag (Weidlich & Haag
(1983, 1988), Weidlich (1991)).
This model assumes behavioral changes to
occur with a certain probability per time
unit, called the transition rate. The transi-
tion rate is decomposed into
• a rate describing spontaneous behav-
ioral changes, and
• a rate describing behavioral changes due
to pair interactions of individuals.
Three different kinds of pair interactions can
be distinguished:
• First, imitative processes, which de-
scribe the tendency to take over the be-
havior of another individual.
• Second, avoidance processes, causing an
individual to change the behavior if
meeting another individual with the
same behavior.
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• Third, compromising processes, which
describe the readiness to change the be-
havior to a new one when meeting an
individual with another behavior.
Representative solutions of the model are il-
lustrated by computer simulations. By dis-
tinguishing several subpopulations a, differ-
ent types of behavior can be taken into ac-
count.
As one would expect, there is a connection
of this model with the game dynamical equa-
tions. In order to establish this connection,
the transition rates have to be taken in a
special way which depends on the expected
success of the behavioral strategies. The es-
sential effect is given by imitative processes.
A stochastic formulation of the game dy-
namic equations shows that the ordinary
game dynamical equations result as equa-
tions for the most probable behavioral distri-
bution or as approximate mean value equa-
tions.
For the approximate mean values corrections
can be calculated. These corrections depend
on the (co)variances σij of the numbers ni of
individuals who show a certain behavior i.
The calculation of the (co)variances is also
useful to determine the reliability of game
theoretical descriptions.
An example of two equivalent competing
strategies serves as an illustration of the
game dynamical equations and their stochas-
tic version. It allows the description of the
selforganization of a behavioral convention.
2 The master equation
Suppose, we have a social system with N in-
dividuals. These individuals can be divided
into A subpopulations a consisting of Na in-
dividuals, i.e.,
A∑
a=1
Na = N .
By subpopulations different social groups
(e.g. blue and white collars) or different char-
acteristic types of behavior are distinguished.
The Na individuals of each subpopulation a
are distributed over several states
i ∈ {1, . . . , S} ,
which represent the behavior or the (behav-
ioral) strategy of an individual. If the occu-
pation number nai denotes the number of in-
dividuals of subpopulation a who show the
behavior i, we have the relation
S∑
i=1
nai = Na . (1)
Let
n := (n11, . . . , n
a
i , . . . , n
A
S )
be the vector consisting of all occupation
numbers nai . This vector is called the socio-
configuration, since it contains all informa-
tion about the distribution of the N individ-
uals over the states i. P (n, t) shall denote
the probability to find the socioconfiguration
n at time t. This implies
0 ≤ P (n, t) ≤ 1 and
∑
n
P (n, t) = 1 .
If transitions from socioconfiguration n to n′
occur with a probability of P (n′, t+∆t|n, t)
during a short time interval ∆t, we have a
(relative) transition rate of
w(n′,n; t) := lim
∆t→0
P (n′, t+∆t|n, t)
∆t
.
The absolute transition rate of changes from
n to n′ is the product w(n′,n; t)P (n, t) of
the probability P (n, t) to have the config-
uration n and the relative transition rate
w(n′,n; t) if having the configuration n.
Whereas the inflow into n is given as the sum
over all absolute transition rates of changes
from an arbitrary configuration n′ to n, the
outflow from n is given as the sum over all
absolute transition rates of changes from n
to another configuration n′. Since the tem-
poral change of the probability P (n, t) is de-
termined by the inflow into n reduced by the
outflow from n, we find the master equation
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ddt
P (n, t) = inflow into n
− outflow from n
=
∑
n′
w(n,n′; t)P (n′, t)
−
∑
n′
w(n′,n; t)P (n, t) (2)
(see Haken (1983)), which is a stochastic
equation.
It shall be assumed that two processes con-
tribute to a change of the socioconfiguration
n:
• Individuals may change their behavior
i spontaneously and independently of
each other to another behavior i′ with
an individual transition rate w˜a(i
′, i; t).
These changes correspond to transitions
of the socioconfiguration from n to
n
a
i′i := (n
1
1, . . . , (n
a
i′ + 1),
× . . . , (nai − 1), . . . , nAS )
with a configurational transition rate
w(nai′i,n; t) = n
a
i w˜a(i
′, i; t), which is
proportional to the number nai of indi-
viduals who can change the behavior i.
• An individual of subpopulation a may
change the behavior from i to i′ dur-
ing a pair interaction with an individ-
ual of a subpopulation b who changes
the behavior from j to j′. Let transi-
tions of this kind occur with a probabil-
ity w˜ab(i
′, j′; i, j; t) per time unit. The
corresponding change of the sociocon-
figuration from n to
n
ab
i′j′ij := (n
1
1, . . . , (n
a
i′ + 1), . . . ,
× (nai − 1), . . . , (nbj′ + 1),
× . . . , (nbj − 1), . . . , nAS )
leads to a configurational transition rate
w(nabi′j′ij,n; t) = n
a
i n
b
jw˜ab(i
′, j′; i, j; t),
which is proportional to the num-
ber nai n
b
j of possible pair interac-
tions between individuals of subpop-
ulations a resp. b who show the be-
havior i resp. j. (Exactly speaking—
in order to exclude self-interactions—
nai n
a
i w˜aa(i
′, j′; i, i; t) has to be replaced
by nai (n
a
i − 1)w˜aa(i′, j′; i, i; t), if P (n, t)
is not negligible where nai ≫ 1 does
not hold, and
∑
j′ w˜aa(i
′, j′; i, i; t) ≪
w˜a(i
′, i; t) is invalid.)
The resulting configurational transition rate
w(n′,n; t) is given by
w(n′,n; t)
:=

nai w˜a(i
′, i; t) if n′ = nai′i
nai n
b
jw˜ab(i
′, j′; i, j; t) if n′ = nabi′j′ij
0 otherwise.
(3)
As a consequence, the explicit form of the
master equation (2) is
d
dt
P (n, t)
=
∑
a,i,i′
[
(nai′ + 1)w˜a(i, i
′; t)P (nai′i, t)
− nai w˜a(i′, i; t)P (n, t)
]
+
1
2
∑
a,i,i′
∑
b,j,j′
[
(nai′ + 1)(n
b
j′ + 1)
×w˜ab(i, j; i′, j′; t)P (nabi′j′ij , t)
− nai nbjw˜ab(i′, j′; i, j; t)P (n, t)
]
(see Helbing (1992a)).
3 Most probable and expected behavioral
distribution
Because of the great number of possible so-
cioconfigurations n, the master equation for
the determination of the configurational dis-
tribution P (n, t) is usually difficult to solve
(even with a computer). However,
• in cases of the description of single or
rare social processes the most probable
behavioral distribution
Pa(i, t) :=
n̂ai (t)
Na
is the quantity of interest, whereas
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• in cases of frequently occuring social
processes the interesting quantity is the
expected behavioral distribution
Pa(i, t) :=
〈nai 〉t
Na
.
Equations for the most probable occupa-
tion numbers n̂ai (t) can be deduced from a
Langevin equation for the development of
the socioconfiguration n(t). For the mean
values 〈nai 〉t of the occupation numbers nai
only approximate closed equations can be
derived. A measure for the reliability (or
representativity) of n̂ai (t) and 〈nai 〉t with re-
spect to the possible temporal developments
of nai (t) are the (co)variances σ
ab
ij (t) of n
a
i (t).
3.1 Mean value and (co)variance
equations
The mean value of a function f(n, t) is de-
fined by
〈f(n, t)〉t ≡ 〈f(n, t)〉 :=
∑
n
f(n, t)P (n, t) .
It can be shown that the mean values of the
occupation numbers f(n, t) = nai are deter-
mined by the equations
d〈nai 〉
dt
= 〈mai (n, t)〉 (4)
with the drift coefficients
mai (n, t) :=
∑
n′
(n′ai − nai )w(n′,n; t)
=
∑
i′
[
wa(i, i′; t)nai′
− wa(i′, i; t)nai
]
(5)
and the effective transition rates
wa(i′, i; t) := w˜a(i
′, i; t)
+
∑
b
∑
j′
∑
j
w˜ab(i
′, j′; i, j; t)nbj (6)
(see Helbing (1992a)). Obviously, the con-
tributions w˜ab(i
′, j′; i, j; t)nbj due to pair in-
teractions are proportional to the number nbj
of possible interaction partners.
3.1.1 Approximate mean value and
(co)variance equations
Equations (4) are no closed equations, since
they depend on the mean values 〈nai nbj〉,
which are not determined by (4). However, if
the configurational distribution P (n, t) has
only small (co)variances
σabij :=
〈
(nai − 〈nai 〉)(nbj − 〈nbj〉)
〉
= 〈nai nbj〉 − 〈nai 〉〈nbj〉 , (7)
we find in first order Taylor approximation
the approximate mean value equations
∂〈nai 〉
∂t
≈
〈
mai (〈n〉, t)
+
∑
b,j
(nbj − 〈nbj〉)
∂mai (〈n〉, t)
∂〈nbj〉
〉
= mai (〈n〉, t) . (8)
In many cases, the initial configuration n0
at time t0 is known by a measurement, i.e.,
the initial distribution is
P (n, t0) = δnn0 ,
where the Kronecker function δxy is de-
fined by
δxy :=
{
1 if x = y
0 if x 6= y .
As a consequence, the (co)variances σabij van-
ish at time t0 and remain small during a cer-
tain time interval. For the temporal develop-
ment of σabij , the equations
dσabij
dt
=
〈
mabij (n, t)
〉
+
〈
(nai − 〈nai 〉)mbj(n, t)
〉
+
〈
(nbj − 〈nbj〉)mai (n, t)
〉
(9)
can be found. Here,
mabij (n, t)
:=
∑
n′
(n′ai − nai )(n′bj − nbj)w(n′,n; t)
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= δab
(
δii′
∑
j
[
najw
a(i, j; t)
+ naiw
a(j, i; t)
]
−
[
nai′w
a(i, i′; t)
+ naiw
a(i′, i; t)
])
+
∑
j′
∑
j
[
najn
b
j′w˜ab(i, i
′; j, j′; t)
+ nai n
b
i′w˜ab(j, j
′; i, i′; t)
]
−
∑
j′
∑
j
[
nai n
b
j′w˜ab(j, i
′; i, j′; t)
+ najn
b
i′w˜ab(i, j
′; j, i′; t)
]
. (10)
are diffusion coefficients (see Helbing
(1992a)). Equations (9) are, again, no closed
equations. However, a first order Taylor
approximation of the coefficients m....(n, t)
leads to the equations
∂σabij
∂t
≈ mabij (〈n〉, t)
+
∑
c,k
(
σacik
∂mbj(〈n〉, t)
∂〈nck〉
+ σbcjk
∂mai (〈n〉, t)
∂〈nck〉
)
(11)
(see Helbing (1992a)), which are solv-
able together with (8). The approximate
(co)variance equations (11) allow the deter-
mination of the time interval during which
the approximate mean value equations (8)
are valid (see figures 3a and 3b). They are
also useful for the calculation of the reliabil-
ity (or representativity) of descriptions made
by (8).
3.1.2 Corrected mean value and
(co)variance equations
Equations (8) and (11) are only valid for the
case ∣∣∣σabij ∣∣∣≪ 〈nai 〉〈nbj〉 , (12)
where the absolute values of the (co)varian-
ces σabij are small, i.e., where the configura-
tional distribution P (n, t) is sharply peaked.
For increasing (co)variances, a better ap-
proximation of (4), (9) should be taken. A
second order Taylor approximation results
in the corrected mean value equations
∂〈nai 〉
∂t
≈ mai (〈n〉, t)
+
1
2
∑
b,j
∑
c,k
σbcjk
∂2mai (〈n〉, t)
∂〈nbj〉∂〈nck〉
(13)
and the corrected (co)variance equations
dσabij
dt
≈ mabij (〈n〉, t)
+
1
2
∑
c,k
∑
d,l
σcdkl
∂2mabij (〈n〉, t)
∂〈nck〉∂〈ndl 〉
+
∑
c,k
(
σacik
∂mbj(〈n〉, t)
∂〈nck〉
+ σbcjk
∂mai (〈n〉, t)
∂〈nck〉
)
. (14)
Note, that the corrected mean value equa-
tions explicitly depend on the (co)variances
σabij , i.e., on the fluctuations due to the
stochasticity of the processes described!
They cannot be solved without solving the
(co)variance equations. However, the calcu-
lation of the (co)variances is always recom-
mendable, since they are a measure for the
reliability (or representativity) of the mean
value equations.
A comparison of exact, approximate and cor-
rected mean value and variance equations is
given in figures 1 to 3. A citerium for the va-
lidity of (8) and (11) resp. (13) and (14) are
the relative central moments
Cm(i1, . . . , im; t)
:=
〈
(na1i1 − 〈na1i1 〉) · . . . · (namim − 〈namim 〉)
〉
〈na1i1 〉 · . . . · 〈namim 〉
.
Whereas the approximate equations (8), (11)
already fail, if
|Cm| ≤ 0.04 (15)
is violated for m = 2 (compare to (12), (7)),
the corrected equations (13), (14) only pre-
suppose (15) for 2 < m ≤ l with a cer-
tain value l (see Helbing (1992a)). How-
ever, even the corrected equations (13), (14)
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become useless, if the probability distribu-
tion P (n, t) becomes multimodal.
Figures 1 to 3 show computational results
corresponding to the example of section 5.3.
Exactmean values 〈n1〉 and variances σ11 are
represented by solid lines, whereas approxi-
mate results according to (8), (11) are rep-
resented by dotted lines, and corrected re-
sults according to (13), (14) by broken lines.
As expected, the corrected mean value equa-
tions yield better results than the approxi-
mate mean value equations.
Figure 1: Exact (—), approximate (· · ·) and cor-
rected (– –) mean values (upper curves) and vari-
ances (lower curves) for a small configurational dis-
tribution P (n, t): Both, approximate and corrected
equations are applicable.
Figure 2: As figure 1, but for a broad configurational
distribution: The corrected equations still yield use-
ful results, whereas the approximate equations al-
ready fail, since the variances are not negligible.
Figure 3a: As figure 1, but for a multimodal config-
urational distribution: Not only the approximate but
also the corrected equations fail after a certain time
interval. However, whereas the approximate mean
value and variance become unreliable already for
t > 1, the corrected mean value and variance remain
valid until t > 3.
Figure 3b: The relative central moments are a cri-
terium for the validity of the approximate resp. the
corrected mean value and (co)variance equations: If
|C2| (—) exceeds the value 0.04, the approximate
equations fail, whereas the corrected equations fail,
if |C3| (– –) or |C4| (· · ·) exceed the value 0.04.
3.2 Equations for the most probable
behavioral distribution
The master equation (2) can be reformulated
in terms of a Langevin equation (see Hel-
bing (1992)):
d
dt
nai (t)
N≫1
= mai (n, t) + fluctuations . (16)
The Langevin equation (16) describes the
behavior of the socioconfiguration n(t) in de-
pendence of process immanent fluctuations
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(that are determined by the diffusion coeffi-
cients mabij ). As a consequence,
d
dt
n̂ai (t)
N≫1
= mai (n̂, t) (17)
are the equations for the most probable oc-
cupation numbers n̂ai (t). The equations (17)
look exactly like the approximate mean value
equations (8). Therefore, if N ≫ 1, the ap-
proximate mean value equations (8) have an
interpretation even for great variances, since
they also describe the most probable behav-
ioral distribution.
4 Kinds of pair interactions
The pair interactions
i′, j′ ←− i, j
of two individuals of subpopulations a resp.
b who change their behavior from i resp. j
to i′ resp. j′ can be completely classified ac-
cording to the following scheme:
i, i ←− i, i
i, j ←− i, j
}
(0)
i, i ←− i, j (i 6= j)
j, j ←− i, j (i 6= j)
}
(1)
i, j′ ←− i, i (j′ 6= i)
i′, j ←− j, j (i′ 6= j)
i′, j′ ←− i, i (i′ 6= i, j′ 6= i)
 (2)
i, j′ ←− i, j (i 6= j, j′ 6= j, j′ 6= i)
i′, j ←− i, j (i 6= j, i′ 6= i, i′ 6= j)
i′, j′ ←− i, j (i 6= j, i′ 6= i, j′ 6= j,
i′ 6= j, j′ 6= i)
 (3)
j, i ←− i, j (i 6= j)
i′, i ←− i, j (i 6= j, i′ 6= i, i′ 6= j)
j, j′ ←− i, j (i 6= j, j′ 6= j, j′ 6= i)
 (4)
Obviously, the interpretation of the above
kinds k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4} of pair interactions
is the following:
(0) During interactions of kind (0) both in-
dividuals do not change their behavior.
These interactions can be omitted in the
following, since they have no contribu-
tion to the change of P (n, t) or nai (t).
(1) The interactions (1) describe imitative
processes (processes of persuasion), i.e.,
the tendency to take over the behavior
of another individual.
(2) The interactions (2) describe avoidance
processes, where an individual changes
the behavior when meeting another in-
dividual showing the same behavior.
Processes of this kind are known as aver-
sive behavior, defiant behavior or snob
effect.
(3) The interactions (3) represent some
kind of compromising processes, where
an individual changes the behavior to
a new one (the “compromise”) when
meeting an individual with another be-
havior. Such processes are found, if a
certain behavior cannot be maintained
when confronted with another behavior.
(4) The interactions (4) describe imita-
tive processes, in which an individual
changes the behavior despite of the fact,
that he or she convinces the interaction
partner of his resp. her behavior. Pro-
cesses of this kind are very improbable
and shall be excluded in the following
discussion.
For the transition rates corresponding to
these kinds of interaction processes the fol-
lowing plausible form shall be assumed (see
Helbing (1992)):
w˜ab(i
′, j′; i, j; t) := ν˜ab(t)
×

p1ab(i
′|i; t) if i′ = j and j′ = j
p1ba(j
′|j; t) if j′ = i and i′ = i
0 if i′ = j and j′ 6= j
0 if j′ = i and i′ 6= i
pkab(i
′|i; t)
×pkba(j′|j; t) otherwise (k ∈ {2, 3}).
(18)
Here,
νab(t) := Nbν˜ab(t)
is the contact rate between an individual of
subpopulation a with individuals of subpop-
ulation b. pkab(j|i; t) is the probability of an
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individual of subpopulation a to change the
behavior from i to j during a pair interaction
of kind k with an individual of subpopulation
b, i.e., ∑
j
pkab(j|i; t) = 1 .
Let us assume
pkab(j|i; t) := fkab(t)Ra(j, i; t) ,
where fkab(t) is a measure for the frequency of
pair interactions of kind k between individ-
uals of subpopulation a and b, and Ra(j, i; t)
is a measure for the readiness of individuals
belonging to subpopulation a to change the
behavior from i to j during a pair interac-
tion. Inserting the rate (18) of pair interac-
tions into (6) and using the conventions
wa(i
′, i; t) := w˜a(i
′, i; t) ,
wab(i
′, j′; i, j; t) := Nbw˜ab(i
′, j′; i, j; t) ,
νkab(t) := νab(t)f
k
ab(t) ,
Pa(i, t) :=
〈nai 〉
Na
, (19)
we arrive at the approximate mean value
equations
d
dt
Pa(i, t) =
∑
i′
[
wa(i, i′; t)Pa(i
′, t)
−wa(i′, i; t)Pa(i, t)
]
(20)
(see (8), (5)) with the mean transition rates
wa(i, i′; t) := wa(i, i
′; t) +Ra(i, i
′; t)
×
∑
b
[(
ν1ab(t)− ν3ab(t)
)
Pb(i, t)
+
(
ν2ab(t)− ν3ab(t)
)
Pb(i
′, t)
+ ν3ab(t)
]
(21)
(ifNa ≫ 1; seeHelbing (1992, 1992b)). The
mean transition rates include contributions
of spontaneous behavioral changes, and of
behavioral changes due to pair interactions
(i.e., of imitative, avoidance and compromis-
ing processes). (20), (21) are Boltzmann-
like equations (see Boltzmann (1964), Hel-
bing (1992a)).
Due to (1), (19), and 0 ≤ nai ≤ Na we have
the relations∑
i
Pa(i, t) = 1 and 0 ≤ Pa(i, t) ≤ 1 .
Therefore, Pa(i, t) can be interpreted as the
fraction of individuals within subpopulation
a who show the behavior i. With respect to
the total population, the fraction P (i, t) of
individuals with behavior i is given by
P (i, t) =
〈ni〉
N
:=
∑
a
〈nai 〉
N
=
∑
a
Na
N
〈nai 〉
Na
=
∑
a
Na
N
Pa(i, t) .
4.1 Computer simulations
For an illustration of the Boltzmann-like
equations (20), (21) we shall assume to have
two subpopulations (A = 2), and three dif-
ferent behaviors (S = 3). With
Ra(i
′, i; t) :=
eUa(i
′,t)−Ua(i,t)
Da(i′, i; t)
, (22)
(see Weidlich and Haag (1988), Helbing
(1992)) the readiness Ra(i
′, i; t) for an indi-
vidual of subpopulation a to change the be-
havior from i to i′ will be the greater, the
greater the difference of the utilities Ua(., t)
of behaviors i′ and i is, and the smaller the
incompatibility (“distance”)
Da(i
′, i; t) = Da(i, i
′; t) > 0
between the behaviors i and i′ is.
In the following computer simulations
Da(i
′, i; t) ≡ 1 has been taken. For both sub-
populations the prefered behavior, i.e., the
behavior with the greatest utility Ua(i, t) is
represented by a solid line, whereas the be-
havior with the lowest utility is represented
by a dotted line, and the behavior with
medium utility by a broken line. Figures 4a
to 6b show the effects of imitative processes
(ν1ab(t) ≡ 1, ν2ab(t) ≡ 0 ≡ ν3ab(t)), of avoid-
ance processes (ν2ab(t) ≡ 1, ν1ab(t) ≡ 0 ≡
ν3ab(t)), resp. of compromising and imitative
processes (ν3ab(t) ≡ 1 ≡ ν1ab(t), ν2ab(t) ≡ 0)
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a) for equal behavioral preferenes (U1(1) =
c = U2(1), U1(2) = 0 = U2(2), U1(3) =
−c = U2(3)), and
b) for different behavioral preferences
(U1(1) = c = U2(2), U1(2) = 0 = U2(1),
U1(3) = −c = U2(3)).
In more complicated cases, there are also os-
cillatory or chaotic behavioral changes possi-
ble, as illustrated in figures 7 (see Helbing
(1992b, 1992)) and 8 (see Helbing (1992)).
Figure 4a: Effect of imitative processes for two sub-
populations prefering the same behavior (c = 0.5):
Only the fraction of the prefered behavior (—) is in-
creasing. The other behaviors vanish in the course of
time.
Figure 4b: Effect of imitative processes for two sub-
populations prefering different behaviors (c = 0.5):
The prefered behavior (—) becomes the predomi-
nating one in each subpopulation, but the behavior
which is prefered in the other subpopulation (– –)
can also convince a certain fraction of individuals. A
behavior which is not prefered by any subpopulation
(· · ·) vanishes.
Figure 5a: Effect of avoidance processes for two sub-
populations prefering the same behavior (c = 1): The
fraction of the prefered behavior (—) is limited, since
the subpopulations avoid to show the same behavior.
As a consequence, the other behaviors are also used
by a certain fraction of individuals.
Figure 5b: Effect of avoidance processes for two
subpopulations prefering different behaviors (c = 1):
The fraction of the prefered behavior (—) wins a
greater majority in comparison with figure 5a, since
the situations of avoidance are reduced.
Figure 6a: Effect of compromising and imitative
processes for two subpopulations prefering the same
behavior (c = 0.5): Only the prefered behavior (—)
survives, since a readiness for compromises is not
necessary.
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Figure 6b: Effect of compromising and imitative
processes for two subpopulations prefering different
behaviors (c = 0.5): Most of the individuals show
the prefered behavior (—), but a certain fraction of
individuals also decides for a compromise (· · ·).
Figure 7a: Oscillations are one possible effect of
imitative processes. For S = 5 different behaviors,
the oscillatory changes look quite irregular without
a short-term periodicity.
Figure 7b: Phase portrait of oscillatory changes be-
tween S = 5 behaviors having the shape of a torus:
A long-term periodicity is indicated by the closeness
of the curve.
Figure 8: Phase portrait of the scaled variables
yi(τ ) := αiP (i, βt) representing chaotic changes of
the behavioral fractions P (i, t).
5 Game dynamical equations
In game theory, i denotes a (behavioral)
strategy. Let Ea(i, t) be the expected success
of a strategy i for an individual of subpopu-
lation a, and
〈Ea〉 :=
∑
i
Ea(i, t)Pa(i, t)
the mean expected success. If the relative in-
crease
dPa(i, t)/dt
Pa(i, t)
of the fraction Pa(i, t) is assumed to be pro-
portional to the difference [Ea(i, t) − 〈Ea〉]
between the expected and the mean ex-
pected success, one obtains the game dynam-
ical equations
d
dt
Pa(i, t) = νa(t)Pa(i, t)
[
Ea(i, t) − 〈Ea〉
]
.
(23)
That means, the fractions of strategies with
an expected success that exceeds the average
〈Ea〉 are growing, whereas the fractions of
the remaining strategies are falling. For the
expected success Ea(i, t), one often takes the
form
Ea(i, t) :=
∑
b
∑
j
Aab(i, j; t)Pb(j, t) , (24)
where Aab(i, j; t) have the meaning of pay-
offs. We shall assume
Aab(i, j; t) := rab(t)Eab(i, j; t)
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with
rab(t) :=
νab(t)∑
c
νac(t)
,
where rab(t) is the relative contact rate of
an individual of subpopulation a with indi-
viduals of subpopulation b, and Eab(i, j; t) is
the success of strategy i for an individual of
subpopulation a during an interaction with
an individual of subpopulation b who uses
strategy j. Since rab(t)Pb(j, t) is the relative
contact rate of an individual of subpopula-
tion a with individuals of subpopulation b
who use strategy j, Ea(i, t) is the mean (or
expected) success of strategy i for an individ-
ual of subpopulation a in interactions with
other individuals.
By inserting (24) and
〈Ea〉 =
∑
i′
∑
b,j
Pa(i
′, t)Aab(i
′, j; t)Pb(j, t)
into (23), one obtains the explicit form
d
dt
Pa(i, t)
= νa(t)Pa(i, t)
[∑
b,j
Aab(i, j; t)Pb(j, t)
−
∑
i′
∑
b,j
Pa(i
′, t)Aab(i
′, j; t)Pb(j, t)
]
(25)
of the game dynamical equations. (25) is a
continuous formulation of game theory (see
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988)). Equa-
tions of this kind are very useful for the in-
vestigation and understanding of the compe-
tition or cooperation of individuals (see, e.g.,
Mueller (1990), Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1988), Schuster et. al. (1981)).
A slightly generalized form of (23),
d
dt
Pa(i, t)
=
∑
i′
[
wa(i, i
′; t)Pa(i
′, t)
− wa(i′, i; t)Pa(i, t)
]
(26a)
+ νa(t)Pa(i, t)
[
Ea(i, t) − 〈Ea〉
]
, (26b)
is also known as selection mutation equa-
tion (Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988)):
(26b) can be understood as effect of a
selection (if Ea(i, t) is interpreted as fit-
ness of strategy i), and (26a) can be un-
derstood as effect of mutations. Equation
(26) is a powerful tool in evolutionary bi-
ology (see Eigen (1971), Fisher (1930),
Eigen and Schuster (1979), Hofbauer
and Sigmund (1988), Feistel and Ebeling
(1989)). In game theory, the mutation term
could be used for the description of trial and
error behavior or of accidental variations of
the strategy.
5.1 Connection between Boltzmann-like
and game dynamical equations
One expects that there must be a connec-
tion between the Boltzmann-like equations
(20), (21) and the game dynamical equations
(26), since they are both quantitative mod-
els for behavioral changes. A comparison of
(20), (21) with (26) shows, that both models
can become identical only under the condi-
tions
ν1ab(t) = νa(t)δab ,
ν2ab(t) = 0 ,
ν3ab(t) = 0 . (27)
That means, the game dynamical equations
include spontaneous and imitative behav-
ioral changes, but they exlude avoidance and
compromising processes.
In order to make the analogy between the
game dynamical and the Boltzmann-like
equations complete the following assump-
tions have to be made:
• In interactions with other individuals
the expected success
Ea(i, t)
=
∑
b,j
νab(t)∑
c
νac(t)
Eab(i, j; t)Pb(j, t)
(28)
of a strategy is evaluated. This is possi-
ble, since an individual is able to deter-
mine the quantities νab(t), Pb(j, t) and
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Eab(i, j; t): An individual of subpopula-
tion a meets individuals of subpopula-
tion b with a contact rate of νab(t). With
a probability of Pb(j, t), the individuals
of subpopulation b use the strategy j.
During interactions with individuals of
subpopulation b who use the strategy j,
an individual of subpopulation a has a
success of Eab(i, j; t) if using the strat-
egy i.
• In interactions with individuals of the
same subpopulation an individual tends
to take over the strategy of another indi-
vidual, if the expected success would in-
crease: If an individual who uses a strat-
egy i meets another individual of the
same subpopulation who uses a strat-
egy j, they will compare their expected
success’ Ea(i, t) resp. Ea(j, t) (by obser-
vation or exchange of their experiences).
The individual with strategy i will imi-
tate the other’s strategy j with a proba-
bility p1ab(j|i; t) that is growing with the
expected increase
∆jiEa := Ea(j, t) − Ea(i, t)
of success. If a change of strategy would
imply a decrease of success (∆jiEa < 0),
the individual will not change the strat-
egy i. Therefore, the readiness for re-
placing the strategy i by j during an
interaction within the same subpopula-
tion can be assumed to be
Ra(j, i; t) := max
(
Ea(j, t)−Ea(i, t), 0
)
,
(29)
where max(x, y) is the maximum of the
two numbers x and y. However, due to
different criteria for the grade of success,
the expected success of a strategy i will
usually be varying with the subpopula-
tion a (i.e., Ea(i, t) 6= Eb(i, t) for a 6= b).
As a consequence, an imitative behav-
ior of individuals belonging to different
subpopulations is not plausible, and we
shall assume
f1ab(t) := δab ,
that means,
ν1ab(t) = νaa(t)δab .
Inserting (27), (28) and (29) into the
Boltzmann-like equations (20), (21), the
game dynamical equations (26) result as a
special case, since
max
(
Ea(i, t)− Ea(j, t), 0
)
− max
(
Ea(j, t) − Ea(i, t), 0
)
= Ea(i, t)− Ea(j, t) .
5.2 Stochastic version of the game
dynamical equations
Applying the formalism of section 2, a
stochastic version of the game dynamical
equations can easily be formulated. This is
given by the master equation (2) with the
configurational transition rates (3) and
wab(i
′, j′; i, j; t)
:= Nbw˜
1
ab(i
′, j′; i, j; t)
:= νa(t)δabR̂a(i, j; t)δii′δij′(1− δij)
+ νa(t)δabR̂a(j, i; t)δjj′δji′(1− δij) ,
where
R̂a(j, i; t) := max
(
Êa(j, t)− Êa(i, t), 0
)
and
Êa(i, t) :=
∑
b
∑
j
Aab(i, j; t)
nbj
Nb
(compare to Feistel and Ebeling (1989),
Ebeling and Feistel (1982), Ebeling et.
al. (1990)). A comparison with (8), (20),
(21) shows, that the ordinary game dynami-
cal equations (26) are the approximate mean
value equations of this special master equa-
tion. Therefore, they can only be interpreted
as mean value equations as long as the
(co)variances σabij are small (see (12)). Oth-
erwise they describe the most probable be-
havioral distribution (see sect. 3.2).
5.3 Selforganization of behavioral
conventions by competition between
equivalent strategies
This section gives an illustration of the meth-
ods and results derived in sections 5 and 5.2.
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As an example, we shall consider a case with
one subpopulation only (A = 1), and, there-
fore, omit the index a in the following. Let
us suppose the individuals to choose between
two equivalent strategies i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e., the
payoff matrix A(t) shall be symmetrical:
A(t) ≡
(
A(i, j; t)
)
:=
(
A+B B
B A+B
)
.
(30)
According to the relation
n1 + n2 = N
(see (1)), the fraction P (2, t) = 1 − P (1, t)
is already determined by P (1, t). By scaling
the time,
ν(t) ≡ 1
can be presupposed. For the spontaneous
change of strategies due to trial and error
we shall assume the transition rates
w(j, i; t) :=W . (31)
A situation of the above kind is the avoid-
ance behavior of pedestrians (see Helbing
(1991)): In pedestrian crowds with two oppo-
site directions of movement, the pedestrians
have sometimes to avoid each other in or-
der to exclude a collision. For an avoidance
maneuver to be successful, both pedestrians
concerned have to pass the respective other
pedestrian either on the right hand side or on
the left hand side. Otherwise, both pedestri-
ans have to stop (see figure 9). Therefore,
both strategies (to pass pedestrians on the
right hand side or to pass them on the left
hand side) are equivalent, but the success of
a strategy grows with the number ni of in-
dividuals who use the same strategy. In the
payoff matrix (30) we have A > 0, then.
The game dynamical equations (26) corre-
sponding to (30), (31) have the explicit form
d
dt
P (i, t) = −2
(
P (i, t)− 1
2
)
×
[
W +AP (i, t)
(
P (i, t) − 1
)]
.
(32)
According to (32), P (i) = 1/2 is a stationary
solution. This solution is stable only for
κ := 1− 4W
A
< 0 ,
⑦
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✕❑
♥
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁☛ ❯P (1) P (2)
P (2) P (1)
Figure 9: For pedestrians with an opposite direction
of motion it is advantageous, if both prefer either the
right hand side or the left hand side when trying to
pass each other. Otherwise, they would have to stop
in order to avoid a collision. The probability P (1) for
choosing the right hand side is usually greater than
the probability P (2) = 1−P (1) for choosing the left
hand side.
i.e., if spontaneous strategy changes due to
trial and error (the “mutations”) are dom-
inating. For κ > 0 the stationary solution
P (i) = 1/2 is unstable, and the game dy-
namical equations (32) can be rewritten in
the form
d
dt
P (i, t) = −2
(
P (i, t)− 1
2
)
×
(
P (i, t)− 1 +
√
κ
2
)
×
(
P (i, t)− 1−
√
κ
2
)
.
That means, for κ > 0 we have two addi-
tional stationary solutions P (i) = (1+
√
κ)/2
and P (i) = (1 − √κ)/2, which are stable.
Depending on the random initial condition
P (i, t0), one strategy will win a majority of
100·√κ percent. This majority is the greater,
the smaller the rate W of spontaneous strat-
egy changes is.
At the critical point κ = κ0 := 0 there ap-
pears a phase transition. This can be seen
best in figures 10 to 12, where the distribu-
tion P (n, t) ≡ P (n1, n2; t) = P (n1, N−n1; t)
loses its unimodal form for κ > 0. As a con-
sequence of the phase transition, one strat-
egy is prefered, i.e. a behavioral convention
develops.
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Figure 10: Probability distribution P (n, t) ≡
P (n1 , N − n1 ; t ) of the socioconfiguration
n = (n1, N−n1) for two equivalent competing strat-
egies. Mutation dominated region (κ < 0): Since
P (n1, N − n1; t) has, after a certain time interval,
one maximimum at n1 = N/2, each strategy will
most probably be used by about one half of the in-
dividuals.
Figure 11: As figure 10, but for the critical point
κ = 0: The broadness of the probability distribution
P (n1, N −n1; t) indicates critical fluctuations, i.e., a
phase transition.
Figure 12: As figure 10, but after the phase tran-
sition (κ > 0): The configurational distribution
P (n1, N − n1; t) becomes multimodal with maxima
that are symmetrical with respect to N/2, because of
the equivalence of the strategies. Due to the maxima
at n1 > N/2 and n2 = N − n1 > N/2, one of the
strategies will very probably win a majority of users.
This implies the selforganization of a behavioral con-
vention.
Figure 13: As figure 11, but with a modified ansatz
for the readiness Ra(j, i; t) to change the behavior
from i to j, which does not produce a crease of
P (n1, N − n1; t) at N/2.
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The crease of P (n1, N−n1; t) at n1 = N/2 =
n2 is a consequence of the crease of the func-
tion R̂a(j, i; t) = max(Êa(j, t)−Êa(i, t), 0). It
can be avoided by using the modified ansatz
R̂a(j, i; t) :=
eÊa(j,t)−Êa(i,t)
Da(j, i; t)
(compare to (22)), which also shows a phase
transition for κ = 0 (see figure 13).
6 Summary and Conclusions
A quite general model for behavioral changes
has been developed, which takes into account
spontaneous changes and changes due to pair
interactions. Three kinds of pair interactions
have been distinguished: imitative, avoid-
ance and compromising processes. The game
dynamical equations result for a special case
of imitative processes. They can be inter-
preted as equations for the most probable
behavioral distribution or as approximate
mean value equations of a stochastic formu-
lation of game theory. In order to determine
the reliability (or representativity) of game
dynamical descriptions, one has to evaluate
the corresponding (co)variance equations.
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